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SHOULD A PROFESSIONAL DEGREE BE CONSIDERED A
MARITAL ASSET UPON DIVORCE?
by
DR. MARVIN M. MOORE*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HAS BEEN a common practice in this country during recent decades for
a wife to put her husband through college and/or professional school.
As one writer notes, "'[plutting hubby through' college, law school, medical
school, or other education program ('getting a Ph.T.,' as it is sometimes
called), appears to be a firmly entrenched American institution. . .. "I As
several courts have observed, however, the marriages of these upwardly-
mobile young couples often founder and terminate shortly after the husband
has completed his education.' Typically, there are few tangible assets to
be distributed between the parties upon divorce because most of the couple's
income (generated exclusively or principally by the wife) has been expended
for living and educational expenses.' This situation-where a divorce takes
place shortly after the husband obtains a professional or graduate degree-
presents the divorce court with a difficult problem. How can the court divide
the parties' limited assets in a way that will fairly compensate the wife for
having enabled her husband to become a professional person or executive?'
*Professor of Law, The University of Akron School of Law; B.A., 1955, Wayne State
University; J.D., 1957, L.L.M., 1960, J.S.D., 1968, Duke University.
'Erickson, Spousal Support Toward the Realization of Educational Goals: How the Law
Can Ensure Reciprocity, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 947, 948 n.4 (1978).
2 See, e.g., Graham v. Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 434, 574 P.2d 75, 78 (1978) (Carrigan, J.,
dissenting) ("This case presents the not-unfamiliar pattern of the wife who, willing to
sacrifice for a more secure family financial future, works to educate her husband, only to
be awarded a divorce decree shortly after he is awarded his degree."); Moss v. Moss, 80
Mich. App. 693, 694, 264 N.W.2d 97, 98 (1978) ('This case presents the not uncommon
situation of a wife who, having worked so that her husband could obtain a professional edu-
cation, finds herself left by the roadside before the fruits of that education can be har-
vested.").
8 "Thus, the 'educational partnership' marriage is . .. one in which the only [significant]
asset acquired during the marriage is the professional degree." Greene, Dissolution of the
'Educational Partnership' Marriage, 55 FLA. B.J. 292, 293 (1981).
4This question presupposes that the court has the authority to divide the parties' assets
between them upon divorce. The court does have such authority in a majority of states.
Thirty-nine states and Washington D.C. follow the equitable distribution system and confer
authority upon the court to distribute all or some of the property owned by the couple at
the time of the divorce in accordance with guidelines set forth in an applicable state statute.
This group includes Ohio. Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as of
August 1, 1980, 6 FAM. L. REP. 4043, 4051 (1980). Eight states and Puerto Rico have a
community property system. Under this arrangement, title to all property acquired during
marriage, with limited exceptions, vests in the marital community and is divisible upon
divorce. Comment, Family Law: Ought a Professional Degree be Divisible as Property Upon
Divorce? 22 WM. & MARY L. RLv. 517, 523 (1981). Finally, five states follow the strict
common law rule, under which property division is determined by title alone and the divorce
court has little or no authority to distribute property in accordance with special equities. id.
at 520.
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Basically four different responses are possible.
a. Degree as Marital Property Response. One approach is to treat
the husband's professional degree (or license) as a form of marital
property, to evaluate it by some formula that takes into account the
husband's projected earnings (over all or some portion of his anticipated
professional lifetime), and to award the wife a part of the degree's thus-
determined monetary value.5
b. Restitutional Response. A second response is, as before, to treat the
husband's degree as a marital asset but to simply award the wife, as
restitution, a sum approximating the monies she directly or indirectly
contributed to the acquisition of the degree.
c. Alimony Response. A third approach is to compensate the wife solely
by means of an alimony award.
d. Equitable Division of Tangible Assets Response. This approach
simply divides, as equitably as possible, whatever few tangible assets
the parties have accumulated, however, inadequately this may com-
pensate the wife, making the philosophical judgment that she made
her contributions of her own volition and in effect assumed the risk
that her marriage would last.'
Although all four responses have their advocates, it appears that treat-
ing the degree as marital property is the most popular response among legal
writers7 and the alimony response is the one most frequently utilized by
5 In the recent unpublished New Jersey case of Lynn v. Lynn, No. M-9842-77 (Sup. Ct.
1981), the Superior Court of Bergen County held that the husband's medical degree Was a
divisible marital asset valued at $308,886. Greene, supra note 3, at 295. In In re Marriage
of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1978), where the wife, Donna, had worked at
a bank to help her husband through law school, the Iowa Supreme Court amffrmed an
$18,000 award to Donna, as part of the property division, explaining "(i)t is the potential
for increase in future earning capacity made possible by the law degree and certificate of
admission conferred upon the husband with the aid of his wife's efforts which constitutes the
asset for distribution by the court."
6Although this writer found no case that openly invoked an assumption of risk theory
against recovery by the wife, cases were found where the court's decision left the wife with
very little property and the court's opinion seemed to reflect an assumption of risk point of
view. See, e.g., Graham v. Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); In re Marriage of
McManama, 399 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 1980).
Comment, Horstmann v. Horstmann: Present Right to Practice A Profession as Marital
Property, 56 DEN. LJ. 677, 678 (1979) ("To the extent the Iowa court [in In re Marriage
of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978)] views the joint acquisition of a license to
practice law in the nature of a franchise to be considered in a division of property, the
author agrees it is within the equitable powers of the court to recognize that interest.");
Note, Divorce After Professional School: Education and Future Earning Capacity May Be
Marital Property, 44 Mo. L. REv. 329, 339-40 (1979) ('There is a need to go beyond the
constraints of the traditional, narrow concepts of property so that courts will not remain
impotent in the midst of this social dilemma and can rectify present inequities. Horstmann
[In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978)] . . . has taken the first step
toward this goal in ruling that a spouse's potential earning capacity acquired during marriage
with the aid of the other spouse's effects is a marital asset subject to property division upon
dissolution."); Note, In re Marriage of Graham: Education Acquired During Marriage -
For Richer or Poorer? 12 J. MAR. J. Pmc. & Poc., 709, 729 (1979) ("With alimony un-
available and no property to divide, the potentially needy spouse is left unprotected. Where
[Vol. 15:3
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the courts.' It is the position of this writer that the fairest and most prac-
tical solution is the restitutional response: to treat the husband's professional
degree as a form of marital property and to award the wife restitution for
her contributions to its acquisition.
II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST TREATING A PROFESSIONAL DEGREE
As A MARITAL ASSET
Although treating the degree as marital property differs significantly
from the restitutional response, both remedies are grounded on the assump-
tion that a husband's professional degree is a form of property in which
the contributing wife is entitled to share in some manner upon divorce. To
date, a majority of the courts which have passed on the issue have been
unwilling to treat a professional degree (or license) as a divisible marital
asset.9 These courts have advanced five arguments in defense of their posi-
tion:
1. A professional degree or license lacks some customary attributes of
property - such as transferability and objective market value - and it
would be inappropriate and unreasonable for a divorce court to consider such
an intangible and personal possession to be a form of property.
In Graham v. Graham,0 the wife, an airline stewardess, had provided
such threatened deprivation is evidenced, the only accessible item from which to seek
relief may be the collectively-attained, though singularly-possessed, education."); Comment,
Family Law: Ought a Professional Degree Be Divisible as Property Upon Divorce? 22 WM.
& MARY L. Rev. 517, at 519 (1981) ("This Note contends that to allow a court to classify
an advanced educational degree or license as marital property subject to division upon
divorce is both reasonable and necessary. . . If through the working spouse's effort the
degreed spouse becomes unjustly enriched, the courts as a matter of equity must value and
distribute the professional degree as a marital asset.").
8 See Wheeler v. Wheeler, 193 Neb. 615, 228 N.W.2d 594 (1975) (wife's aid in the estab-
lishment of her husband's career as a veterinarian was deemed significant in assessing ali-
mony); Magruder v. Magruder, 190 Neb. 573, 209 N.W.2d 585 (1973) (schoolteacher-wife
who had supported the family while her husband attended medical school was awarded ali-
mony of $833.33 per month for ten years and two months); Loukota v. Loukota, 177 Neb.
355, 128 N.W.2d 809 (1964) (wife was awarded $10,000 alimony where she had put her
husband through college and medical school); Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 131 (1969) (wife who had worked full time while her husband was attending
college and law school and establishing a practice was awarded alimony of $200
per month); Lira v. Lira, 68 Ohio App. 2d 164, 428 N.E.2d 445 (1980) (wife, a
schoolteacher, was awarded alimony of $250 per month after she had contributed sub-
stantially to her husband's support while he was attending medical school in Guadalajara,
Mexico); Daniels v. Daniels, 20 Ohio Op. 2d 458, 185 N.E.2d 773 (1961) (wife was
awarded alimony of $24,000 where her father's contributions of $16,000-$20,000 during
the couple's marriage had enabled her husband to complete medical school at Ohio State
University); Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d 1071 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974) (wife who had
supported her husband through both college and medical school was awarded $39,600
alimony, not abatable upon remarriage).
9"The courts in those few jurisdictions which have considered the issue presented on this
appeal have taken a variety of approaches in dealing with it. The majority of those jurisdic-
tions have -held that a professional degree is not 'property' subject to division after the dissolu-
tion of.a marriage." Dewitt v. Dewitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 53, 296 N.W.2d 761, 765 (1980).
10 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978).
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seventy percent of the couple's financial support while her husband, Dennis,
successfully pursued a B.S. and M.B.A. degree. The Supreme Court of
Colorado held that Dennis's M.B.A. was not divisible marital property,
declaring:
An educational degree, such as an M.B.A., is simply not en-
compassed even by the broad views of the concept of "property." It
does not have an exchange value or any objective transferable value
on an open market. It is personal to the holder. It terminates on the
death of the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned, sold,
transferred, conveyed, or pledged . . . . It may not be acquired by
the mere expenditure of money. . . . In our view, it has none of the
attributes of property in the usual sense of that term. 1
A weakness in this argument is that broader definitions of property easily
encompass a professional degree. In In re Marriage of McManama," Justice
Hunter observed in his dissenting opinion:
[M]any courts have found that intangible and nontransferable
items should be treated as property for some purposes. As Justice
Marshall of the United States Supreme Court has said: "The decisions
of this Court have given constitutional recognition to the fact that in
our complex modem society, wealth and property take many forms.
We have said that property interests requiring constitutional protection
extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money."
The Supreme Court of Colorado stated in Las Anemas County High School
District v. Raye:'4 "In short it [property] embraces anything and everything
which may belong to a man and in the ownership of which he has a right to
be protected by law."'" Thus, only the more restrictive definitions of property
exclude a professional degree, and there does not appear to be any com-
pelling reason why courts should feel constrained to adopt such a restrictive
definition.
A more basic criticism of the degree-lacks-property-attributes argument
"Id. at 432, 574 P.2d at 77. Accord, Lira v. Lira, 68 Ohio App. 2d 164, 167-68, 428 N.E.2d
445, 448 (1980) where the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County held: "We rule that,
since a medical license cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, pledged, or devised .... the
trial court did not err in finding that 'plaintiff's medical degree is not subject to division, but
is rather one factor to be considered in arriving at an equitable division.'"
12 399 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 1980).
Is Id. at 374 (Hunter, J., dissenting) (citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 207-08 (1974)(Marshall, J., dissenting).
'4 144 Colo. 367, 356 P.2d 237 (1960). (This case involved the reorganization of a school
district and whether uncollected tax revenues of the old district were distributable "properties
and assets" within the meaning of the applicable statute.).
15 Id. at 371, 356 P.2d at 239 (quoting Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck, 275 Mo. 339,352-53, 205 S.W. 196, 198 (1918)). The English philosopher-reformer Jeremy Bentham de-
fined property as "nothing but a basis of expectation; the expectation of deriving certain
advantages from a thing which we are said to possess, in consequence of the relation in
which we stand towards it." J. BNrHAm, THE THEORY OF LEoISLATION 111-12 (R. Hildreth
trans. 2d ed. 1871).
[V/ol. 15:3
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is that it gives insufficient weight to the fact that in the situation under
discussion there is usually little other property to distribute to the wife as
compensation for having supported her husband through his educational
period. One law review writer notes that "[a] scarcity of other assets at the
date of dissolution leaves the supporting spouse with little unless she is en-
titled to share in the [husband's] acquired increase in potential earning
capacity."' 6 Consequently, a refusal to treat the husband's professional de-
gree as a marital asset would seem to result in the unjust enrichment, of
the husband."
2. The value of a professional degree or license is too speculative for it to
be capable of evaluation and division.
This argument was advanced in DeWitt v. DeWitt" and Todd v. Todd."
In the former case the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed a judgment
awarding $14,316 to a wife for having supported her husband through
college and law school. The court stated, "We cannot agree . . . that equity
is served by attempting to place a dollar value on something so intangible
as a professional education, degree, or license . . .Other approaches for
valuing a professional degree have been suggested and attempted. We think
they share the disadvantage of being wholly speculative."2 ° In the Todd
case, the court also declined to treat the husband's legal education as a
form of divisible property, finding that "[a]t best, education is an intangible
property right, the value of which, because of its character, cannot have
a monetary value placed upon it for division between spouses."'
A frailty in this argument is that evaluating a professional degree does
not appear to involve any more speculation or uncertainty than does the
assessment of damages for pain, mental distress, or loss of consortium, and
for which a majority of courts allow awards.2" In fact, the courts commonly
allow an evaluation of a professional education for the purpose of calcu-
lating damages in wrongful death and personal injury cases.23
16 Note, Divorce After Professional School: Education and Future Earning Capacity May
Be Marital Property, 44 Mo. L. REv. 329, 333 (1979).
17 In Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 750 (Okla. 1979), where the wife, Delores, had
helped support her husband while he attended college and medical school, the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma held that Delores was entitled to a cash award for her contributions,
saying that "[w]hile it is true that Dr. Hubbard's license to practice medicine is his to do
with as he pleases, it is nonetheless also true that Ms. Hubbard has an equitable claim to re-
payment for the investment she made in his education and training. To hold otherwise
would result in the unjust enrichment of Dr. Hubbard."
18 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (1980).
19 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969).
20 98 Wis. at 56-58, 296 N.W.2d at 767-68 (citations omitted).
2 1272 Cal. App. 2d at 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
22 Regarding pain and mental distress, see E. KIoNKA, TORTS IN A NUrSHELL 357-58 (1977);
respecting loss of consortium, see W. PRossER, HANDBooK OF THE LAw oF TORTS § 125 at
889-90 (4th ed. 1971).
23 Note, Graduate Degree Rejected as Marital Property Subject to Division Upon Divorce:
In re Marriage of Graham, 11 CoNN. L. REv. 62, 71 (1978). See also Graham v. Graham
Winter, 1982]
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Moreover, under the proposal advocated by this writer - to treat the
husband's professional degree as a marital asset and to require the husband
to make restitution to his wife for her contributions to its acquisition-there
is actually no need to determine the husband's probable future professional
earnings. One need only ascertain the amounts that wife contributed to
husband's educational expenses (tuition, related fees, books, etc.) and re-
quire husband to reimburse wife for these outlays. In addition, the husband
should be required to compensate his wife for one half the couple's living
expenses incurred during his educational period. After all, he would have
been compelled to pay the university dormitory and cafeteria (or some
private counterparts) for these necessities had he been unmarried. Although
some of these expenses may have to be estimated, the difficulty of compu-
tation certainly seems surmountable, and the possibility of abuse appears
limited by the practical fact that a wife seeking reimbursement for her con-
tributions will have to bear the burden of proof.
Two cases that followed this restitutional response are DeLa Rosa v.
DeLa Rosa24 and Inman v. Inman.2" In the first case, the parties were mar-
ried while the husband, Pedro, was attending college in California. The wife,
Elena, worked full time and supported Pedro through the remainder of
his undergraduate education and through two and one-half years of medical
school. Pedro then sued for a dissolution. The Minnesota Supreme Court
awarded $11,400 to Elena as "restitutionary relief,"26 saying:
It is this Court's view that the award should have been limited to
the monies expended by respondent for petitioner's living expenses
and any contributions made toward petitioner's direct educational
costs. To achieve this result, we subtract from respondent's earnings
her own living expenses. This has the effect of imputing one-half of
the living expenses and all the educational expenses to the student
spouse.2"
In Inman the couple was married prior to the entry of the husband,
John, into dental school. The wife, Sue, taught school while John was in
dental school and throughout most of the parties' seventeen-year marriage.
Because of heavy indebtedness, the couple's net worth at the time of their
divorce was "zero, give or take a few hundred dollars.""8 Although reversing,
in part, a specific restitutional award to Sue and remanding for additional
findings of fact, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that it was proper
194 Colo. 429, 435, 574 P.2d 75, 79 (Colo. 1978) where dissenting Justice Carrigan notesthat "[wihere a husband is killed, his widow is entitled to recover for loss of his future
support damages based in part on the present value of his anticipated future earnings, which
may be computed by taking into account probable future increases in his earning capacity."
24 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981).
25 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
28 309 N.W.2d at 759,
27 Id.
;s 78 S.W.2d at 267.
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for the trial court to award Sue restitution for her contributions to the
attainment of John's dental degree. The court stated:
In most cases, we feel that the best measure of a spouse's in-
terest in such a degree should be measured by his or her monetary invest-
ment in the degree ...
Thus the amount spent for direct support and school expenses
during the period of education, plus reasonable interest and adjust-
ments for inflation, should be apportioned to the spouse who provided
support when, as in the case of the Inmans', there is little or no marital
property . . .
In summation, we affirm in principle the Meade Circuit Court's
allowance of a professional degree (or the increased earning capacity
that it represents) as marital property. 9
3. To treat a professional degree as marital property subject to division or
compensation unduly restricts the personal freedom of the husband because
it compels the husband to pursue the career envisioned by the court which
evaluated the degree.
This argument was articulated in DeWitt v. DeWitt:"0
A person qualified by education for a given profession may choose not
to practice it, may fail at it, or may practice in a specialty, location
or manner which generates less than the average income enjoyed by
fellow professionals. The potential worth of the education may never
be realized for these or many other reasons. An award based upon
the prediction of the degree holder's success at the chosen field may
bear no relationship to the reality he or she faces after the divorce.
Unlike an award of alimony, which can be adjusted after divorce to
reflect unanticipated changes in the parties' circumstances, a property
division may not. The potential for inequity to the failed professional
or one who changes careers is at once apparent; his or her spouse
will have been awarded a share of something which never existed in
any real sense."'
A law review writer expressed the same point more tersely: "[i]mpingement
upon personal freedom to utilize such a skill or professional ability speaks
29 578 S.W.2d at 269-70. Accord Mahoney v. Mahoney, 175 N.J. Super. 443, 419 A.2d 1149
1980), where the wife, June, had been solely responsible for supporting the couple through-
out a sixteen-month period during which the husband, Melvin, successfully pursued an M.B.A.
The court ordered Melvin to "reimburse" June in the amount of $5,000, saying:
The court holds that the education and degree obtained by plaintiff, under the
circumstances of this case, constitute a property right subject to equitable offset upon
the dissolution of the marriage. Some reasonable sum as a credit should be allowed
by the court on behalf of the maintenance of the household and the support of plain.
tiff during the educational period.
Id. at 447, 419 A.2d at 1150-51.
80 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (1980).
31 Id. at 58, 296 N.W.2d at 768.
Winter, 1982]
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strongly to the exclusion of such an intangible property from division upon
divorce."32
As an objection to the response which treats the degree as marital
property (evaluating the husband's professional degree and then awarding
wife a substantial fraction of the dollar computation), this argument un-
deniably has force. But it clearly has no application as an objection to the
restitutionary response, advocated by this writer. Whatever use the husband
decides to make of his professional training, it should not be unduly burden-
some to require him to reimburse his wife for her contributions to its ac-
quisition.
4. Alimony is a better means of compensating the wife for her assistance
in the attainment of the husband's professional education.
Beyond doubt alimony is a popular method of repaying a wife who has
aided her husband in obtaining a professional degree." Two recent cases
which adopted the alimony response are Moss v. Moss" and Colvert v. Col-
vert.'5 In the former case the wife, Susan, had worked as a school guidance
counselor throughout the parties' seven-year marriage. During this period,
the husband attended medical school and completed his internship. At the
time of their divorce the couple had not accumulated any substantial assets.
The Court of Appeals of Michigan affirmed a judgment awarding Susan
$15,000 alimony in gross, observing that "[it was impossible to award the
wife a portion of the husband's medical degree, the only substantial asset
acquired during coverture. An [alimony] award of $15,000 fairly repre-
sents the wife's contribution to the acquisition of that asset, financial and
otherwise."30
In Colvert, where the husband was also a medical student, the wife,
Cynthia, was the couple's principal breadwinner from 1971 until shortly
before the parties' divorce, in January of 1976. At that time the husband
was only six months away from attainment of his M.D. degree. The Su-
preme Court of Oklahoma affirmed a judgment awarding Cynthia $35,000
in alimony payable in monthly installments, finding this a reasonable award.
The court explained:
In the present case, prior to marital problems, the family unit made
an investment, not in personal or real property, but in the husband's
professional education as a doctor. That effort was enhanced and made
32 Note, In re Marriage of Graham: Education Acquired During Marriage - for Richer or
Poorer? 12 J. MAP. J. PRAC. & PRoc. 709, 728-29 (1979).
3 See supra note 8 and cases listed.
84 80 Mich. App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97 (1978).
35 568 P.2d 623 (Okla. 1977) rev'd on other grounds, Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747,
752 (Okla. 1979).
P6 80 Mich. App. at 695, 264 N.W.2d at 98.
[Vol. 15:3
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possible by the wife becoming the principal support for the family
through her own education, profession, and work .... 11
Two advantages to compensating the wife through alimony (rather
than through any system of property division) are that a husband cannot
escape alimony obligations by going through bankruptcy38 and that alimony
can be modified up or down as the husband's income rises or falls."9 How-
ever, there are several offsetting disadvantages to a reliance on alimony as
a means of compensating a wife who put her husband through professional
school.
First, alimony is commonly based on need,'" and a wife who has
supported her spouse through college and/or professional school has normal-
ly demonstrated that she is capable of supporting herself.
Superficially, an award of permanent, periodic alimony would
seem a plausible resolution. However, such awards are necessarily predi-
cated upon a need on the part of the recipient spouse for support....
... The wife in such a relationship, is ordinarily, by definition,
capable of self-support: it was she who supported the family unit during
the educational period."
Secondly, in assessing alimony the courts are usually expected to give
weight to the duration of the marriage,42 and in the situation under dis-
cussion, the marriage typically has been relatively brief.
Thirdly, in awarding alimony the courts traditionally have considered
the standard of living enjoyed by the couple during their marriage," and in
the situation in question, that standard of living was usually relatively
spartan.
Fourthly, unlike a division of property, alimony is never a matter of
entitlement, but is instead discretionary with the judge or referee," and
S7 568 P.2d at 626.
88 Erickson, supra note 1, at 965.
s9 "As a safeguard, modification of the [alimony] award is available should extenuating cir-
cumstances arise, a feature unavailable to the division of property." Note, supra note 32, at
721.
40 H. CL , Tim LAw oF DoMEsTc RMLATONS 444 (1968).
,"Greene, supra note 3, at 294.
42 "[A] generous alimony award following a short-lived marriage is disfavored." Comment,
Horstmann v. Horstmann: Present Right to Practice a Profession as Marital Property, 56
DEN. L.J. 677, 683 (1979). An illustrative statute is Omo Rv. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (B)
(Page 1980), which provides, in part: "In determining whether alimony is necessary, and de-
termining the nature, amount, and manner of payment of alimony, the court shall consider
all relevant factors, including . . . 5. The duration of the marriage. .. ."
43 "[Clourts also base awards of alimony upon such considerations as .. . their standard
of living . Clark, supra note 40, at 446. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.18(B) (Page
1980) states, in part: "In determining whether alimony is necessary . . . the court shall
consider...: 7. The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage. ... "
44 "Alimony ... lies within the discretion of the trial court; the 'spouse should not be depend-
ent on the discretion of the court ...to provide her with the equivalent of what should
be hers as a matter of absolute right."' In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 848,
Winter, 1982]
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in practice only about fourteen percent of divorcing wives are awarded any
alimony5
Finally, alimony payment obligations generally terminate upon the wife's
remarriage or death," whereas property division liabilities do not.47
5. To treat a professional degree as a divisible or compensable marital
asset is, in actuality, to make a property division of the husband's post-
divorce earnings, inasmuch as the degree's only value lies in the earning po-
tential conferred by it.
This argument was advanced in In re Marriage of A ufmuth" and Fraus-
to v. Frausto."9 In Aufmuth, where the wife had helped put her husband
through Stanford University School of Law, the California Court of Appeals,
First District, held that the husband's legal education was not marital prop-
erty, reasoning:
The value of a legal education lies in the potential for increase
in the future earning capacity of the acquiring spouse made possible
by the law degree. . . . A determination that such an "asset" is com-
munity property would require a division of post-dissolution earnings
to the extent that they are attributable to the law degree, even though
such earnings are by definition the separate property of the acquiring
spouse.50
And in Frausto, where the wife, Maria, a schoolteacher, had supported the
couple while her husband, Manuel, had gone through medical school, the
Texas Court of Civil Appeals reversed a lower court judgment awarding
Maria $20,000 as reimbursement for her share of the expenses of Manuel's
education, commenting:
We agree with the jurisdictions that have held a professional edu-
cational degree is not divisible upon divorce.
. . . If the trial court awards monthly payments to be made in
the future by one spouse to the other, such payments must be referable
to property in existence at the time of marriage.
An award of future monthly payments which is specifically referable
to an education received by spouses during marriage, as we have
126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 639 (1976) (quoting In re Marriage of Peterson, 41 Cal. App. 3d 642,
651, 115 Cal. Rptr. 184, 191 (1974)).
45 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS
SPECIAL STuIEs SERIES P-23, No. 112, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1978, 1 (Sept. 1981).46 H. BASS & M. REIN, DIVORCE OR MARRiAGE - A LEGAL GuIDE 125 (1976).
47 Note, supra note 16, at 333.
48 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979).
49611 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1981).
5089 Cal. App. 3d at 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
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in the case before us, violates the rules and authorities hereinbefore
set forth .... 51
This argument, like the third argument" discussed, undoubtedly has
merit when raised as an objection to treating the husband's degree as marital
property (evaluating husband's professional degree and then awarding wife
a sizable fraction of the computed sum), but it has little force when as-
serted as an objection to the restitutional remedy recommended by this
writer. Had the wife formally loaned her husband the money to meet his
expenses, receiving a duly executed promissory note in return, she would
be entitled to collect on her note, notwithstanding a subsequent divorce re-
gardless of whether the divorce occurred in a community property, equitable
distribution, or strict common law jurisdiction." The fact that the note
would have to be paid off out of the husband's post-divorce earnings would
not render it uncollectable. Surely a divorcing wife's right to reimburse-
ment for her contributions to her husband's professional education should
not rest on the technicality of whether she had, at the outset, procured from
her husband a formally executed promissory note.
II. ARGUMENTS FOR TREATING A PROFESSIONAL DEGREE
AS A FORM OF MARITAL PROPERTY
In addition to the obvious goal of desiring to prevent unjust enrich-
ment, " there are three arguments for considering a professional degree
or license to be a marital asset.
First, the wife of a professional school student commonly - and rea-
sonably - views her efforts as an investment leading to future economic
rewards for both parties, and it seems unfair to allow a divorce to render
valueless this investment. This argument was well expressed in Prosser v.
Prosser," where the wife, Naomi, had worked full time to provide support
while her husband, Ernest, attended the University of Nebraska. Shortly
after Ernest's graduation the couple was divorced. The Supreme Court of
Nebraska awarded Naomi $6,500, stating:
It is clear that plaintiff [Naomi] made a large investment in defendant's
future, with the thought no doubt that it was of joint interest to the
52 611 S.W.2d at 659 (citations omitted).
52See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
53See supra note 4. It is assumed, of course, that the wife does not execute a separation
agreement (incorporated in the divorce decree) in which she surrenders her right to collect
on the note. 'The Married Women's Property Acts ordinarily provide that the married wom-
an's property remains her own notwithstanding the marriage. . . . By far the greater number
of states give broad power to the spouses to contract with each other, very often by specific
statutory provision." Clark, supra note 40, at 224 & 226-27.
"'To ignore the contributions of the sacrificing spouse would be to work an injustice, an
unfair advantage to the spouse who has gained the education and degree without obligation.
There would be an unjust enrichment of the educated spouse." Mahoney v. Mahoney, 175
N.J. Super. 443, 446, 419 A.2d 1149, 1150 (1980).
55156 Neb. 629, 57 N.W.2d 173 (1953).
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fuure of both. . . .We point out that this wife had a right to expect
that in years to come she would share in the benefits derived from the
training and ability of the defendant, which she literally helped to
bring about."
Secondly, if the contributing wife is not in some manner compensated
for the value of her husband's professional degree, then he is actually being
rewarded for seeking (or causing) a divorce shortly after graduation in that
had he waited a few years before ending the marriage, the couple normally
would have accumulated substantial assets, some of which the divorce court
would have distributed to the wife.57
And thirdly, it seems reasonable to analogize the situation of a young
wife who supports her husband through professional school to that of a
person who makes a gift to his fiancee in contemplation of marriage. It is
well settled that a gift made in direct contemplation of marriage is recover-
able if the donee breaks off the engagement.5" The rationale is that a funda-
mental condition of the gift (marriage) has failed to materialize. 9 Similarly,
a wife's efforts in putting her husband through professional school might
well be regarded as a conditional gift - the unstated condition being that
the marriage will last long enough for the wife to derive some economic
benefits from her spouse's advanced education. Since an early divorce has
prevented this condition from being satisfied, the wife should be allowed
restitution for the value of her contributions.
IV. CONCLUSION
When a divorce occurs shortly after a wife has supported her husband
through college and/or professional school, simple justice demands that
she be reasonably compensated for her contributions. To award her nothing
but a portion of the couple's typically scanty tangible assets will normally
fail to adequately reimburse her. At the other extreme, to evaluate and
"divide" the husband's degree (i.e., to project husband's professional earnings
56 Id. at 632, 57 N.W.2d at 175. The $6,500 granted Naomi was in the form of alimony,
however. See also Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979), where the wife, Delores,had helped put her husband through college, medical school, and internship. The SupremeCourt of Oklahoma held that Delores was entitled to a cash award in an amount sufficient
to compensate her for her investment in her husband's education, reasoning that "Ms. Hub-bard's sacrifices in Mr., now Dr., Hubbard's behalf were made with the anticipation that
she and the family would ultimately benefit from the increased earning potential that would
accompany her husband's license to practice... r Id. at 751. "To avoid unnecessary con-fusion and speculation, we stress that we have done nothing in this action but allow Ms.
Hubbard a return on her investment. . . ." Id. at 752.5 7 
"Had the parties remained married for a period after the husband's graduation, substantial
marital property would have been accumulated... . The classic situation . ..where no
marital property has been accumulated ... rewards the husband who petitions for divorceimmediately after graduation." Note, Educational Degree Does Not Constitute Marital Proper-ty Subject to Division Between Spouses Upon Divorce, Graham v. Graham, 194 Colo. 429,574 P.2d 75 (1978), 13 TULsA LJ. 646, 651 (1978).
58Clark, supra note 40, at 22-23.
91Id. at 22.
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over his probable working life and then to award the wife a division of the
calculated total) is to rely too heavily on speculation and to unduly burden
the husband. To reimburse only by means of an alimony award is to ex-
clude those wives whose situations are not appropriate for alimony. The
fairest solution is to acknowledge that the husband's degree is a marital
asset and to require him to repay his wife for her direct and reasonably
related contributions to his professional education.
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